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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In July 2007, the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in the
USA, in addition to the announce of the deep economic crisis that we suffer for
more than seven years, revealed the apparent inability of the existing supervisory
and regulation systems to prevent, control and manage the effects of systemic
risk in an increasingly global world. 
The creation in 2008 of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) by the G20
detected two problems which constitute the basis of the subsequent renewal of
the global financial system. First, a need for a close coordination among states
(to prevent risks) and second, the urgency to design the tools that are necessary
to control the effects of the global crisis. Considering both circumstances, we are
trying to rebuild the financial system focusing in re-establishing a supervisory
and regulatory system with three main objectives: to create transparency,
increase the solvency of financial institutions and create effective protection,
especially at small investor. 
In this international context, the relevance of the EU as a participant member
of that renewed global financial system is crucial, despite the loss of power that
the EU has suffered after the global economic crisis. 
Since 2008, the EU becomes aware of the effects of not having effective and
coherent economic governance, and the need for greater coordination of eco-
nomic policy. As we know, the EU pre-crisis economic policy was mainly based
on consensus, non mandatory standards, except in the context of budgetary pol-
icy, which was defined in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
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From 2011 on, the EU decides to improve its economic governance system,
that is to say, the institutions and procedures designed to achieve the objectives
of the Treaty on European Union in an economic frame. Therefore, it has to
improve the coordination of economic policies in order to promote economic
and social progress of EU citizens. To do this, we try to remodel the three large
blocks of European governance: an economic agenda strengthened by closer
monitoring of the EU, the European Stability Mechanism and third, new efforts
to renew the financial system. In this context, and following the strategy of FSB,
we have to provide the system with transparency, awarding solvency to financial
institutions and protecting the retail investor. To achieve these goals, the EU has
firstly created new rules and agencies to prevent problems and ensure that it reg-
ulates and properly monitors the activities of financial agents. Secondly, the EU
is provided with actions to ensure that European banks have sufficient capital
reserves to withstand the turmoil that may threaten the financial system in the
future, so that they can continue operating and providing credit to households
and businesses. 
In this new governance model, the Banking Union assumes a very important
role. The project to create a Banking Union is founded on three pillars: a
European Banking Authority (EBA), a Single Banking Supervisor whose role is
transferred to the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Deposit Guarantee
Fund to liquidate and restructure banks problems. The relevance of the ECB in
this project takes unprecedented proportions in the EU Treaties and the Statute
of the ECB. Also, this role generates skepticism and political reticence about the
political role, philosophy and legal limits that the BCE is up to take. 
The aim of this study is to analyze the European Central Bank as an essential
political element of the economic and banking system governance. With this pur-
pose, we study its legitimacy (based on the agency theory), responsibility
(accountability) and its political independence and security devices. To accom-
plish this goal, the paper is structured as follows: first, a review of the theoretical
framework on the issue. Then we develop each of these three elements: legitima-
cy, accountability and political independence. Finally, we will establish the final
conclusions. 
II.  STATE OF THE ART 
The processes of regionalization and globalization from the second half of
the twentieth century introduced changes in governance systems, previously
determined by the liberal tradition since the nineteenth century, aimed at the
nation-state. 
Questioning the legitimacy of global governance, ie, accountability and polit-
ical control of the new players from the processes of bureaucratization that has
developed through the delegation of functions of independent agents are in the
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basis of the question called crisis of democracy. Absence of govern ability, pri-
vatization of the public, invisible power crisis and rule of law are four aspects,
that authors like Held (1995) highlights when he reflects on the changes intro-
duced in the system of democracy. 
Given these challenges, different perceptions that are committed to rethink-
ing democracy, like the activity of transnational actors as a source of legitimacy
for global governance, are erected. More pessimistic is Dahl (1999) which
emphasizes the difficulty of citizen participation, accountability, attention to
welfare states and the protection of individual freedoms to the blurring of nation-
al boundaries. This question about the crisis of democracy leads to a crisis of
democratic legitimacy, for example, the question of consent as a way of legit-
imizing the actions of elected officials. The crisis of legitimacy is determined by
the inability of the State to exercise its sovereignty. 
The theory of the crisis of legitimacy that Habermas (1975) refers to as a
result of economic history itself preaches a distancing of society with the proce-
dural aspects of democracy. 
The EU is an example of global governance that needs to respond to the chal-
lenges of a model of democracy in profound change. The legitimacy of the EU,
following the classical designation of Weber (1921) in economics and society, is
a legal legitimacy, based on treaties signed by governments to acquire political
commitments. 
From the Weberian conception, legitimacy gradually evolves through Lipset
(1963), Habermas (1975), Rogowski (1974) Beetham (1991) or O’Kane (1993).
One of the last representatives of the theory of legitimacy is Scharpf (2000),
which focuses the problem of the democratic legitimacy of the EU on the ques-
tioning of the legitimacy origin (input) based on the popular will, ie, based the
legitimacy of political elections from the preferences of the members of the com-
munity and the belief of a collective identity. Following this reasoning, the crisis
of democracy creates a problem of discrediting. That is, as Castells (1999)
explains, the crisis of legitimacy adds credibility crisis.
Opposite positions is a Scharpf Moravcski criticism, (2002) focused on the
importance of the legitimacy of the result (out) based on the effectiveness of the
decisions taken, the resolution of the problems in order to generate common welfare
of citizens. Following this argument, Moravcski (2004) points that isolation and
autonomy of the political bodies is legitimate and that even this process of delegat-
ing some political bodies without democratic accountability can increase the legit-
imacy, primarily derived from two main aspects: first, the delegation to supranation-
al bodies makes policies less vulnerable to domestic pressures, prevent the «tyranny
of the majority» and special interests and thus generates the government to commit
to consistent policies dynamically. And secondly, improving the skills of managers
and politicians justified the need of expertise and rational ignorance of voters. That
is, helps save costs in decision making. Thus, in order to mitigate these costs, «tech-
nocracy» and «government of experts» appear as a solution. 
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However, this delegation of Member States to supranational institutions is
leading authors, such as Scharpf et al. (2006), to argue that the governance of the
EU has a democratic deficit where accountability, political control and indepen-
dence are standards review. 
The need for expertise and efficiency leads governments to make a delegation
of power to politically independent institutions, ie, to be directed by unelected
officials. In fact, much of the criticism of the democratic deficit welcomes the
development of technocrats in Brussels and Frankfurt where the government of
the people is replaced by the administration of things. The problem of delegation
to non-majoritarian institutions has to do with the formal legitimacy, ie the issue
of responsibility and accountability. 
Majone (2003) states that the institutions on which authorizes are isolated from
the political and democratic control are to give greater efficiency and credibility of
political commitments in the long term. The hypothesis is that cycles are limit
democratic alternation condition, temporarily making short-term decisions. 
The theory of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions, whose exponent is
the work of Majone (1996), Pollack (1997, 2003) or Tallbert (2000, 2002) is
dominated by the approach of the «Principal-Agent», the «principals», politi-
cians, agents decide to delegate tasks only if the expected benefits of delegation
exceed the costs. This is where we introduce the analysis of the legitimacy of the
ECB, on the theory of agency, where the agent or institution to which competi-
tion has been delegated to (ECB) cedes sovereignty.
Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002) identified three categories of benefits asso-
ciated with, first, the credibility of the promises made  to citizens (commitment),
secondly, the need for policy experts to resolve information asymmetries, and,
finally, that the policies of the agents maximize policy objectives through unpop-
ular programs for certain sectors of society. 
In the case of the EU, the application of this analysis is even more complex
because the delegation at Community level, the Community institutions within
the problem of externally delegation (transfer of decision making power to inde-
pendent institutions) is added. To solve this problem of democratic deficit in the
EU, we can perform various actions. One of the most important is the changes
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon comes into force on
December 1, 2009. It implemented several changes to try to reduce the democ-
ratic deficit. We can summarize this change basically in two fundamental ways.
Firstly, get a compromise of national parliaments and secondly, a greater role for
the European Parliament. 
However, the Lisbon Treaty is itself an example of democratic deficit, ie, is
the result of the inability to articulate a referendum by the Member States in
order to validate transmission channels of responsibility. Hence, this trend seems
to show that the Lisbon Treaty fails to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the
EU. In fact, this argument is supported with the consequences of changes in the
banking system and economic governance in the EU from 2011. 
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The creation of the ECB is an extraordinary exercise of transfer of sovereign-
ty from the member countries of the Eurozone. This unprecedented agreement
should be understood as a transfer under whom member states bear responsibil-
ity. As defined by the Dictionary of the Royal Academy of monetary policy to a
common central bank. In no case should be understood as a transfer, ie as the
«waiver of a right or an action that makes someone in favor of another person»
as that term is defined the same source. This means that the ECB’s tasks origi-
nate in a delegation of monetary policy by the member states should make the
definition of its status and its operational framework. 
Moreover, the central banks of the countries of the euro area the ECB entrust-
ed the design of the euro monetary policy based on the principle of price stability
and this overlapping any other purpose. The ECB should define what is meant
by price stability and also had to design the instruments of monetary policy. By
decision of the Bank itself, the level of inflation that reflects price stability is
equivalent to less than 2%, which is what has set target inflation. In terms of
instruments, the decision has been reducing interest rates; the management is
therefore the only remedy of monetary policy of the ECB. Increasing the money
supply is expressly and strictly excluded. 
Numerous articles of the EU Treaty and the Statute of the Euro System of
Central Banks and of the ECB itself that emphasize and reinforce the indepen-
dence of the latter in the institutional, functional, operational and human
resources field, preserving especially the influence of the governments of the
member states and possible short-term political interests. However, as noted in
Goebel (2005), there are two important aspects in the constitutional framework
in relation to the business of the ECB. First, the Maastricht Treaty included the
Economic and Monetary Union within the framework of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community, rather than place it as a single institution in the
EU along with Foreign Policy and Security and along with Cooperation in
Justice and Home Affairs. Second, the Treaty establishing the European
Community authorizes the Council to regulate certain aspects of the business
of the ECB. Moreover, the European Court of Justice has assigned the role of
judicial review of the business of the ECB. In this context, the ECB should not
be influenced either by the political institutions of the EU nor member states,
despite how reluctant were shown several of these, led by France, the second
largest economy in the Eurozone, to be excluded from this area. The result is
a much more independent than they were the central banks of the Eurozone
countries and what is the Federal Reserve ECB. Again a short discussion of
terminology arises here, because independence is conceived in relation to the
member states, but not for the Board. Furthermore, in regard to the relationship
with member states, these being nothing less than the authors of the transfer of
sovereignty, the ECB has adopted a strict independence, rejecting the possibil-
ity of a functional autonomy, preserving independence operational, would
allow them some participation in priority setting monetary policy in the short
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term. This is without prejudice, of course, the objective of price stability and
policy in the medium and long term. 
Now that devolution does not become an absolute assignment of a crucial
component of economic policy of the euro area, this strict independence with
which the ECB has adopted the first European supranational entity, should be
reconciled with guarantees of legitimacy and accountability. This combination of
independence and responsibility legitimacy does not arise with the courage to
counter but as sine qua non for the credibility and sustainability of the institution. 
Accountability is a concept that goes beyond «held accountable». It is a term
that encompasses two dimensions. First, being responsible means having the
ability to take, recognize and accept the consequences of actions and decisions.
When we talk about responsibility in relation to a particular case, this dimension
of accountability requires that the objectives of the task entrusted to be well
defined and the procedures to be developed by the responsible subject are clear.
But responsibility also carries the implicit obligation to report on the actions and
their results. This second dimension is especially relevant in the case of the lia-
bility associated with tasks that have been delegated to an institution, especially
when dealing with an institution like the ECB born within consolidated democ-
racies and which is necessary for thus, plural exercise control. 
This being so, we can expect a bilateral relationship between the organization
that takes responsibility, the countries of the Euro Zone, and recognizing that
responsibility and full transparency, the ECB agrees. However, this bilateral
relationship need not collide at all with the ECB’s independence. Indeed, the
extent to which the ECB is an independent institution not reduces the degree to
which must be responsible. Independence does not free if accountability and
transparency but on the contrary, the two must go hand in similar levels as they
are a counterpart of the other. It would be a terrible mistake to deliberately
increase the independence of an institution by cutting their duty of transparency,
as the result would be a reduction of its legitimacy. The relationship between
independence and accountability must be direct, especially when it is democrat-
ically legitimate institutions. 
In Article 113 (3) of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 15.1 and 15.3
of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) lie the principle
of transparency and the relationship of the ECB with the European Parliament.
Articles 113 (3) and 15.37 of the Statute requires that the ECB President to sub-
mit an annual report to Parliament on the activities of the ESCB and on the mon-
etary policy. In addition, the President and other members of the Executive
Board may be required to by the European Parliament to testify before the
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Finally, Article 15.19 of the
Statute adds the obligation to publish reports at least quarterly basis. Given that
the European Parliament is the representation that citizens of the EU have demo-
cratically elected, is the appropriate institution for accountability to which the
ECB is required. To properly fulfill this role, the European Parliament needs to
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have enabled a forum is qualified to discuss the financial and monetary issues
ECB activity. The aim is to provide a monetary dialogue with all stakeholders
affected by it, including consumers and citizens of the countries of the euro area. 
Two issues underlie the democratic character of the ECB and its obligation to
accountability. It is first necessary to consider whether to impose the supremacy
of economics over politics, or vice versa. This matter is a core principle in the
creation of supranational institutions and the definition of the functions to be
developed. Must be the conduct of monetary policy in the hands of a team of
technocrats who have not been elected by the people or, on the contrary, must lie
in the political arena? No doubt there are arguments for the former in order to
keep people away monetary policy short-term political interests, especially at
election time. The argument that monetary policy should be designed to maintain
price stability over the medium and long term, protecting the EU economy infla-
tion risk, brings a high degree of consensus in the Eurozone. However, it is also
necessary to note that the jobs and growth should not be excluded in any case the
objectives of economic policy. If we believe that monetary policy is part of eco-
nomic policy and having an impact on employment and growth, it seems reason-
able that the latter among the objectives of the first. If no goals are for the ECB
so compromising containment of inflation, at least expect from this institution
that does business without harming them in the extreme. 
Second, the ultimate goal of the ECB has been strongly questioned during the
crisis, when the defense of the euro has forced him to participate in the financing
of several member states. When the economic environment deteriorates serious-
ly and puts pressure on monetary policy, it is advisable to a certain degree of
flexibility in the latter. Monetary policy should be at the service of citizens; in
no case should these captives of the first. Given that monetary policy has an
impact on employment and growth, ie in the lives of citizens, the fact that its
scope beyond the merely technical and also includes social aspects. Since it is
part of their consequences, the social welfare should also be the responsibility of
the ECB, especially in a recession as it has gone through the Eurozone and even
if necessary temporarily put aside monetary stability as the only goal. 
Moreover, the independence of the European Central Bank is reflected in
Article 108 of the Maastricht Treaty, which clearly states that the European
Central Bank (ECB) cannot receive instructions or the Council or the European
Commission or from any bank center neither of any member country nor of any
individual or agency decisions. The ECB was created in the image and likeness
of the Bundesbank, the German central bank, which was noted for its indepen-
dence from political power. This allowed it to carry out very orthodox monetary
policies, which led to the German economy from enjoying decades of low infla-
tion, high growth and high employment. 
The ECB aims only to achieve price stability. This represents an important
difference from the Federal Reserve, which aims both price stability and job cre-
ation and economic growth. The ECB does not reject entirely the achievement
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of the second objective (economic growth and job creation), but it clearly subor-
dinated to the control of inflation. 
Even the most impetuous of the degree of independence of the European
Central Bank should be similar to the Bundesbank imagined the level of inde-
pendence that should be given to the first defenders. The ECB, now without a
doubt, is the most independent central bank in the world. 
The independence of the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) of the
Euro system has ‘constitutional’ character, as it is enshrined in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union and the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB Statute), rather than in legislation. Independence is an
essential element that facilitates the maintenance of price stability. 
This independence is based on a number of regulatory provisions that consti-
tute the necessary condition so that it can indeed arise. The most important of
these is not an explicit provision, but is implicit in the context of the ECB law
insertion in the institutional framework of the European Union itself. Thus, the
statute of the ECB and, with it, their independently nature, have been included
as a protocol to the Treaty itself of the European Union, has acquired the same
legal value as the Treaty and, therefore, processing and approval have been an
exercise of true «economic constitutionalism» (Louis, JV (1993). This, removed
any intervention by the Community institutions in the definition and operation
of the ECB. Thus, it has managed to break level of the European Communities
traditional state-level connection between the central bank and the parliament,
constitutional body with authority to approve or modify its statute (Montero, A,
2000). 
Along with this constitutional guarantee of independence, the text of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) contains other safeguards designed to consol-
idate effectively. These guarantees refer basically to a number of dimensions of
the independence of the central bank that are necessary to assess the indepen-
dence of the ECB itself. In this sense we can speak of functional, institutional,
personal, financial, economic and political independence. 
A.  FUNCTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Functional independence requires a clearly defined degree of legal certainty
necessary for the central bank to have the means and tools to achieve it, regard-
less of every other priority. The primary objective of the ESCB, established by
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Statute of the
ESCB is to maintain price stability. 
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B.  INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Articles 130 and 282 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB are referring explicitly to the principle
of institutional independence. According to their terms, neither the ECB, nor the
NCBs, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take
instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of a
Member State or from any other body. Additionally, it is forbidden for the insti-
tutions and bodies of the Union and the governments seeking to influence the
members of the governing bodies of the ECB.
C.  INDEPENDENCE STAFF
This refers to the statutory guarantees that try to avoid the influence of polit-
ical power on the central bank members by reason of his appointment, term of
office or any renewals. In the case of the ECB, this kind of independence is pro-
vided with the best guarantees in regard to members of the Executive Committee
(art. 11  of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB), being particularly significant the
safeguards introduced for possible removal of any of its members, and it is only
at the request of the bodies of the ECB’s to take actions that could lead to such
removal (art. 11.4 of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB).
D.  FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE
Guarantees trying to safeguard such independence are perfectly under
Articles 29 to 33 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB. They provide that the
sole subscribers and holders of the capital of the ECB are the national central
banks and the principles governing both the eventual distribution of benefits and
the support for the losses. Moreover, this independence is reinforced by the fact
that its annual budget is not approved by any Community institution but by the
Governing Council of the Bank and also as stipulated in art. 27 of the Statute of
the ESCB, by the exclusion of the possibility that its financial statements or any
of the central banks of the ESCB remain subject to audit by the Court of
Auditors. 
E.  POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
This is defined as the power that has the Central Bank to choose the ultimate
goal of monetary policy. In the case of the ECB, the ultimate goal is unique and
is perfectly defined in Article 105, in terms of achieving price stability. Thus,
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although the article adds that «without prejudice to this objective, it shall support
the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to
the achievement of Community objectives», the ECB only supports them to the
extent that are consistent with price stability and, therefore, «rather than talking
about» primary objective «we speak of exclusive objective, since the secondary
is only operational since it contributes to the realization of the «principal»
(Betancor, 1995 p. 276).
F.  ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE
This refers to the ability of the central bank to choose instruments that will
be used to achieve the goals or objectives that are imposed. In this regard, the
TEU is exhaustively in Article 107, closing the possibility that it may interfere,
both national and EU authorities, on the approach of the ECB or some of the
national central banks of the ESCB. 
This statement is further complemented by a series of provisions designed to
break the relationship between the central bank and government finances, the lat-
ter being understood in its broadest sense (art. 104.1 TEU). Thus, it is to remove
any kind of disturbance on monetary policy arising from the budgetary perfor-
mance of different states, while prescriptions for achieving and maintaining pub-
lic finances (art.104 down. C TEU). 
Ultimately, all these elements were located well above the ECB’s indepen-
dence standards of central banking known far and ahead in the effective imple-
mentation of the theoretical proposals of more advanced institutional reform. 
However, the theoretical underlying link between increasing independence of
the ECB and better results in terms of inflation goes around the concept of cred-
ibility (Montero, 2000). Independence has now become the guarantor of the
credibility of the ECB’s monetary policy and, therefore, an asset that must be
preserved at all costs. 
This explanation, which justifies the granting of independence to the ECB for
the sake of credibility, it has also been widely assumed in political circles. Thus,
in a European Parliament resolution of 15 December 1993, states or «even coun-
tries with correct basic economic indicators may suffer difficulties because mar-
kets do not consider long term credible monetary policy aimed at stability,» and
that in this sense, «the independence of a central bank is an important guarantee
of its credibility». 
But this relationship of «independence-credibility» attributed to the ECB and
the independent central bank is broken when one reads the work of Professor
Montero based on the Posen studies (1995). According to Montero, Posen argues
that «if the central bank independence is a mechanism that allows the govern-
ment to increase the credibility of its commitment to price stability, then an
increase in the degree of independence of the central bank of a country will lead
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to agents leave private behaviors to try to protect the «surprises» of government
induced inflationary. Thus, the inflation rate will be lower in countries whose
central bank is more independent, but only as an observable result of differences
in the behavior of private agents.
Thus, there is evidence that the mechanism through which the independence
of the central bank leads to lower inflation is improving the credibility through
a commitment to price stability. 
The next part of the study analyzes how these changes have affected the
banking governance in the EU and concentrate on the new political role acquired
by the ECB and its impact on the democratic legitimacy, responsibility (account-
ability) and political independence.
III.  THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN NEW
BANKING EU GOVERNANCE: LEGITIMACY, ACCOUNTABILITY
AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE 
The Banking Union as the project that aims to set the governance of the EU
bank has three cornerstones: a European Banking Authority (EBA), a Single
Banking Supervisor whose role is transferred to the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the Deposit Guarantee Fund to liquidate and restructure troubled
banks. In this new context, the ECB acquires exceptional importance as a cor-
nerstone of the Union Bank. 
The new role of the ECB involves micro and macro supervisory functions of
entities that have considered as systemic entities. National supervisors are
responsible of monitoring local authorities and gathering information 
From the Ecofin meeting of 13 December 2012 in which it was agreed to
advance the process of banking union, a strong schedule has been established in
addition to the creation of the single banking supervisor, the direct recapitaliza-
tion of the banks, the establishment of the mechanism for resolving financial
institutions and the common guarantee fund deposits. Thus, from March 2014
the ECB has been set up as the direct supervisor of banks whose assets exceed
30,000 million or 20% of national GDP. In total, 200 banks out of 6000 existing
in the EU.
Questioning the legitimacy of the ECB has been one of the most debated
issues since the creation of the institution. Different theories have been used to
study where the legitimacy of the ECB comes and thus analyze one of the serious
problems it faces, its democratic deficit. None of these theories is final, as any
consensus has been achieved among scholars yet. However, one of the most
widespread theories that attempt to approach the problem more successfully is
the Agency Theory. 
In agency theory, «principal» gives some powers to «agent», via contract, to
defend their interests delegating decision-making in this institution. 
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As evidenced by Shove (2003), the problem is generated when analyzing
who is the principal in certain situations. If this dilemma is considered in the case
of the ECB, one question arises first: if the agency is the ECB, who has given it
its legitimacy? In any case, the legitimacy of the ECB has an institutional char-
acter that comes from the whole European financial system. 
This issue can be raised from two points of view of legitimacy. On one hand
the procedural legitimacy which is determined by the Treaties and the Statute
that regulates ECB´s actions. On the other hand, a more problematic legitimacy
related with the fact that all operators in the European financial system are
affected by its decision making. In fact, regular meetings by the ECB and the
person of the President to inform the decisions taken, is one of the fundamental
elements of control exercised over the institution. 
Regarding the responsibility that the ECB assume in this new phase, the
recent EU crisis has highlighted the need for central banks to be involved in the
management of financial crises in an agile and fast manner. This activity of cen-
tral banks can and should be done without too much interaction with medium
and long term monetary policy objective of price stability. Throughout the crisis,
the ECB has been forced to ease monetary policy by reducing interest rates and
encouraging bank lending to preserve the functioning of the market. To counter-
act malfunction of private banks it was also necessary to boost the central bank
intermediation in banking activity. The result has been quite satisfactory, espe-
cially if we consider that this activity was combined with the maintenance of
price levels well below the target of 2% inflation.
To celebrate its new role as guarantor of financial stability, the ECB pointed
emphasizing the principles that have characterized this institution since its inception,
and has been reaffirmed in maintaining them. As Jean Claude Trichet himself said at
the symposium held in honor of the ECB Lucas Papandreou in May 2010 (ECB,
2010): the principles of i) independence, ii) inflexibility with the objective of con-
taining inflation and iii) away from any form of increase in the money supply, or
quantitative easing remain strict on the activity of the ECB sits pillars. The organiza-
tion is fully determined to maintain its pillars of monetary policy even in the devel-
opment of its new function related to the health of the European financial system. 
This being so it is necessary to rigorously define the ECB role in promoting
stability in the financial system, especially in a context of systemic, as we have
experienced, crises, and distinguishing what governments should develop
through their economic policies. The financial crisis in Europe has led to a crisis
in the sovereign debt market in which the ECB has intervened by buying gov-
ernment bonds issued by countries whose economic weakness threatened the sta-
bility of the euro. This intervention by the Central Bank in the context of sys-
temic crisis in the financial sector is consistent with the functions that might be
called a classic Central Bank. However, it is new in that it adds additional fea-
tures to the mere maintenance of inflation. In addition, the ECB must reconcile
macroeconomic policies aimed at financial stability to monetary policy aimed at
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price stability. For the first time we talked about two goals and two different
instruments to achieve them. It remains to be seen if the ECB will be able to
combine both without interfering with one another. 
Irrespective of the specific mandate in its role in promoting financial stability
and how this reconciles with the maintenance of price stability, what is indis-
putable is that the ECB must meet the same requirements for transparency and
accountability. Maintaining financial stability requires more interaction with
governments that containment of inflation. It could seem that this activity has
direct implications on the independence and democratic accountability require-
ments of the ECB. One would expect that a necessary interaction with govern-
ments reduce their independence and rigor. However, greater integration with the
governments should not compromise their autonomy. The requirement to ensure
their autonomy lies in the clear definition of the responsibility to be moved and
the scope of its mission. It may require enforcing the ECB transparency regard-
ing its strategy and decisions, including those that require intensive interaction
with governments. Transparency will not be impaired to the extent that reports
to citizens and accountability in the European Parliament incorporating aspects
of achieving stability in the financial system along with those relating to price
stability. In this sense, it matters little whether a specific forum for discussion of
the new role of the ECB is created or unifying in the same forum where contain-
ment measures of inflation are discussed in the European Parliament. 
The commitment to accountability and transparency of the exercise should be
strengthened further, if possible, as a result of i) the fact that they should be
involved in two goals, and not a single, and ii) the greater independence that,
somehow, the ECB must develop to prevent excessive involvement with govern-
ments, given that his new job requires him to interact with the latter.
Independence disclaims far but even increases the need for an equivalent coun-
terpart of transparency and accountability. As Randzio (2000) states, the gover-
nors of the central banks of Denmark and the Netherlands are not obliged to
attend their parliaments, which in our view reflects a misunderstanding of inde-
pendence. In consolidated democracies as Europeans, to skip transparency and
accountability equals misinterpret independence, especially in the case of issues
that have direct impact on social welfare. 
Regarding the latter, the interaction with the political sphere, which requires
ensuring financial stability, has very positive consequences from the point of
view of democratic legitimacy. Awarding the ECB a predominant role in macro-
economic policy as a guarantor of financial stability brings this institution closer
to economic objectives related to social welfare. The price goal is due to be man-
aged without consideration of the impact it may have on other variables, possibly
causing a marked deterioration in employment and growth due to the action or
inaction of the ECB. Instead, the prevention of financial crises leads implicit to
avoid measures that have a high social cost. All this assuming that bank losses
can be assumed by public sectors. 
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In relation to the new role of the ECB and its political independence, enhanc-
ing mutual economic program increased oversight of the European Union, safe-
guarding the stability of the euro area and restoring the financial system are the
three major labeled shares in the new governance economy of the European
Union to deal with the crisis. 
As for the ECB, although the forms and regulations are to be discussed yet,
it has already been assumed that new tasks will have to be performed, such as
single supervisor, which takes effect in November this year. The ECB shall
ensure risk levels of the largest Eurozone banks (banks with assets in excess of
EUR 30,000 million or 20% of GDP of the member participant). It shall also
determine whether they should be closed, merged, salvaged or recapitalized by
European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM). This means that the ECB will be the
judge of bailouts in the Eurozone. 
As already noted, the primary mandate of the ECB is to ensure «price stabil-
ity», but since the latest financial crisis other functions have been added: to fos-
ter growth (liquidity programs), to maintain the dynamism of the financial sys-
tem and fund big banks. 
All this will give the ECB more supranational powers which imply that coun-
tries make concessions of sovereignty. But this is not without risks. For example,
the necessary disconnection between monetary policy and bank supervision
would not be guaranteed if the ECB is in charge of both. In addition, political
independence may be compromised from the moment in which the recent ECB
liquidity measures approved as carry interest rate to its minimum, after numer-
ous requests from heads of state of the Eurozone or the same director IMF exec-
utive. It seems clear that the ECB is increasingly into the hands of the national
government of the Eurozone as having taken their rates to 0%. This means that
the tools available have limited impact in the context of fractured monetary con-
ditions across countries. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Following the completion of this study, we have reached the following con-
clusions: 
First, after 2011 and as a result of international negotiations within the G20
(articulated through the FSB) the EU has reformed its economic governance
mechanisms, being the restructure of the banking governance one of the key ele-
ments. The bank governance takes shape in the creation of the Banking Union
where the ECB takes a decisive political role as a supervisor and guarantor of the
European financial system functions in addition to the monetary policy.
Second, we have presented our analysis by examining three factors that we
consider relevant in this new role: its legitimacy, issues regarding responsibility
and political independence. 
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Regarding the ECB new role and its legitimacy, the new functions that we are
providing it at present (in a context where the ECB legitimacy has serious doubts
about its sources) accentuate the debate on the legitimacy «out or result»,
because it creates a greater distance between the ECB decisions and EU citizens,
increasing the democratic deficit problem of the Institution. 
Regarding the ECB accountability mechanisms, the new role of the ECB is
fully consistent with the traditional functions of a central bank, but no doubt it is
a challenge and a threat to the liability standards of the institution, already badly
damaged. As we said, the ECB must reconcile macroeconomic policies, aimed
at financial stability, to monetary policy, aimed at price stability, and should do
so without harming each other. But that’s not the only challenge. Maintaining
financial stability requires more interaction with governments than even the
inflation containment. The BCE must perform this new role without compromis-
ing its autonomy and, of course, meeting the transparency and accountability
requirements. It remains to be seen whether it will be able to accomplish both
challenges. 
Regarding the independence of the ECB, all elements analyzed in this paper
indicate that, so far, the ECB continues to be well above the standards of inde-
pendence of any central bank known so far. However, the financial crisis in
Europe has led to a crisis in the sovereign debt market in which the ECB has
intervened and, therefore, has challenged the stability of the euro. This interven-
tion is new and it adds additional features to the mere maintenance of price sta-
bility. Although the ECB new functions (growth and funding) give the ECB
more supranational powers, political independence can be compromised since
the ECB might continue adopting measures of liquidity that could jeopardize the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
Finally, the debate on the new role of the ECB in the economic governance
of the EU is more alive than ever, specifically as to the Union Bank project. In
fact, much of its potential success stems from Member States capability to
resolve the doubts that may arise on issues such as the ECB democratic legiti-
macy, accountability and political independence. 
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Resumen
Este artículo tiene el objetivo principal de analizar la dimension política del
Banco Central Europeo en el nuevo modelo de gobernanza económica de la
Unión Europea a partir de 2011, focalizando el estudio en tres variable: Su inde-
pendencia política, su legitimidad democrática y la rendición de cuentas a otras
instituciones comunitarias.
Résumé
Cet article a pour but d’analyser la dimension politique de la Banque Centrale
Européenne dépuis 2011 dans le nouveau modèle de gouvernance économique
de l’Union Européenne. L´étude présente trois aspects: Son independance poli-
tique, sa légitimité démocratique et sa responsabilité envers d’autres institutions
communautaires.
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